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Stalin’s reign was defined by rapid industrialization, warfare, and a campaign of terror 
which drastically altered the foundations of Soviet society in many different arenas. In particular, 
the terror encountered under the Stalinist regime created some of the most profound effects on 
the citizenry and culture of the Soviet state. Certainly, as Orlando Figes notes, the effects of the 
terror would never truly leave society even under Khrushchev’s thaw, as it gave rise to “inter-
generational trauma” that created a culture of whisperers and distrust alongside unique forms of 
intimacy.1 Similarly, Martin Amis quotes the biographer Volkogonov to demonstrate how terror 
itself can form the basis for a society, making its removal more difficult, as “no man had ever 
accomplished so fantastic a success… to exterminate millions of his countrymen and receive in 
exchange the whole country’s blind adulation.”2 As such, one cannot understand Soviet society 
or the Stalinist regime without understanding his reign of terror.  
Yet while the effects of the terror were wide ranging, the resulting shifts in the Red Army 
would come to be some of the most significant given the conflicts which would bring the great 
                                               
1 Orlando Figes, The Whisperers (New York: Picador, 2007), 645. 
2 Martin Amis, Koba the Dread (London: Vintage, 2003), 127. 
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colossus of the Soviet state to the brink. While the reasoning behind exactly why the Red Army 
was a target is complicated, the history of the Red Army combined with the political goals of 
Stalin during this period created strong incentives for terror such as the purges. In terms of the 
Red Army’s history, the contentious nature of the creation of the officer corps led to 
politicization and deprofessionalization, which, despite creating a class of ardently patriotic 
commanders, decimated command ability. While the lack of competent commanders did in many 
cases sever the connection between the commanders and the solider, atomization of the members 
of the Red Army did not occur. The result of the terror created group dynamics within units 
which demonstrated the numerous ways in which terror creates intimate contact through 
solidarity, as demonstrated by the performance and accounts of the soldiers at various stages of 
the campaign of terror. Yet at the same time, the changes that lightened the burden of terror 
increased group cohesion and bonding in different, often more consequential ways.  
The Great Purge of 1936-1938 was certainly the most visible of this terror, with some of 
the most high-profile portions of the Red Army command placed on trial. Frequently, it is 
described as the main cause for the initial disastrous performance of the Red Army during the 
conflicts which would soon befall it. The Great Purge significantly reduced the numbers of 
experienced, competent officers at the helm of the Red Army and led to the reintroduction of 
dual-command between the PUR’s (Political Administration of the Workers’ and Peasants Red 
Army, PURKKA or PUR for short) and political commissars and military commissars, making 
any military decisions inherently political and eliminating the final vestiges of professionalism 
and independence. It also reduced the number willing to work as officers, as even those who 
believed in the ideology often viewed it as a path to being labeled or becoming a class enemy 
through accumulation of wealth and privilege. One Junior Lieutenant, after being forced to live 
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in a dugout for months, with continual fear of being purged could barely stand his existence. As 
his suicide note states, “he believes in an even better future… but here there are enemies who sit 
and threaten every step an [sic] honest lieutenant tried to take.” This commander’s decision to 
end his own life, while extraordinary in nature, does at least partially reflect the general feeling 
by officers of terror and hatred from the regime they were serving.3 
Yet, this extremely negative perspective may overstate the effect of the purges on Red 
Army fighting capacity and underestimates their effectiveness despite the terror. The numbers 
cited by Reese as the more accurate numbers (as the effect listed by the Red Army might have 
been overstated in an attempt to get Stalin to stop the purging of the army) are by Shadenko, who 
places the losses at 7.7% in 1937 and 3.7% in 1938, although those purged were 
disproportionately members of the officer corps and high command. Most purged were those in 
the PUR or leaders at division level and higher, thus placing the vast majority of the burden on 
the officer corps rather than the rank and file core of the Red Army. For context, 68 of the 85 
members of the 1936 NKO (People's Commissariat for Defence or Narodny Komissariat 
Oborony) were shot, two committed suicide, and one died in prison and the Gulag. Four others 
were arrested but later released.4 The purges produced an immense effect both in terms of the 
culture of the Red Army and the overall civil-military relationship which surrounded it. The Red 
Army was already a relatively poorly run organization at the time, with rampant indiscipline, 
social divides between workers and peasants, alcoholism, and lack of training. Furthermore, the 
army was seriously struggling with officer shortages, poor training of officers, and intense 
politicization of officers for “crimes.” The military proficiency of the army as a whole was 
                                               
3 Catherine Merridale, Ivan’s War (London: Faber & Faber, 2005), 67. 
Roger R Reese, Red Commanders: A Social History of the Soviet Army Officer Corps, 1918-1991. (Lawrence: 
University Press of Kansas, 2005), 132-133. 
4 Reese, Red Commanders, 122-123. 
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reduced, detrimentally effecting the RKKA’s (Workers and Peasants Red Army) ability to go to 
war. 
The most glaring canary in the coal mine was the Winter War of 1939. With poor 
intelligence about the Finnish defenses and their ability to defend for an extended period, Soviet 
commanders drastically overestimated their potential to defeat Finnish forces. Because of the 
officer corps’ incompetence in allocation of resources and consideration of basic factors of 
winter warfare, the losses were substantially higher, at 350,000 casualties compared to the 
Finnish 70,000. Instead of conquering the country, Stalin had to negotiate a peace treaty.  The 
roots of their failure lie in the “institutional incompetency” of the RKKA. The quality of the 
officer corps dropped drastically, while their individual decision-making authority was crippled 
by the reintroduction of totally inexperienced political oversight. High command gave 
incompetent low-level commanders tasks which they were not educated enough to handle, nor 
brazen enough to take strategic liberties in the sake of better outcomes. As a Ukrainian 
infantryman noted that December, “we’re going to certain death… for every Finn you need ten 
Russkies.” Innovations along the Finnish front by their better organized and more flexible 
commanders allowed for asymmetric warfare. The creation of weapons such as the “Molotov 
Cocktail,” named for the Soviet foreign minister, allowed for cheap anti-tank warfare. The 
Finnish soldiers on the front line noted that they didn’t “know a tank could burn that long” upon 
seeing it in action.5 
As Reese notes, the difference was not in efficacy but in efficiency. The Red Army was 
just as effective as a fighting force but, lacking in morale, decisions made by command stifled 
their ability to combat the enemy. Their weapons were not winter proof, making them unable to 
                                               
5 Merridale, Ivan’s War, 44-45. 
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fire. They weren’t fed enough, severely undermining morale and decreasing their efficiency in 
movement and taking territory. At one point during an advance, a battalion stumbled upon an 
abandoned Finnish camp and upon seeing how much better provisioned they were, the advance 
was halted just to allow them to eat the requisitioned supplies. Their uniforms also put them at a 
disadvantage relative to the Finns, as their muted browns and reds made them stand out against 
the pure white snow compared to the all-white Finnish uniforms. However, there were some 
understated demonstrations of ability during the Winter War. The capacity of units to learn and 
adapt during combat was demonstrated across the board, with many commanders realizing the 
need to regroup and attempt another assault once conditions were more favorable. Many officers 
and soldiers also showed immense bravery under fire, which proved that their motivation to fight 
for the regime was still strong despite their issues. Even given the eventual victory, every party 
involved viewed it as a resounding defeat for the Red Army. Nazi military analysts would later 
use their performance during this conflict as evidence of their inability to engage in sustained 
conflict against a well-prepared opponent. An American correspondent noted that the war 
“revealed more secrets about the Red Army than the last twenty years.” 6 
Meanwhile, a greater conflict was just on the horizon. The Great Patriotic War would be 
the ultimate test of the command’s organizational structure and the driving forces for morale. 
The commanding officer during combat was responsible for the morale of his unit. This would 
change in October 1942 with a decree making the commanding officer codependent with the 
Assistant Commander for Political Affairs. To a degree, the effect of the creation of an untrained 
and unprofessional officer corps brought together the men and the commanders in a form of 
solidarity. The officers of this generation were especially young and likely to have “proletarian” 
                                               
6 Reese, Red Commanders, 139-140.  
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origins, allowing soldiers to relate to them more closely. Furthermore, the changing culture 
produced an unspoken rule that the commander should not demand more of his men than he 
could do himself. Furthermore, the “semi-paternalism” of the political overseers in their constant 
intervention and overruling of the choices and affairs of the military members of the unit created 
common hatred among the men and the officials, making bonding easier. However, other 
changes also affected the relationship between officers and soldiers. Unlike prior years, by 1941 
there was an absolute distinction in rank provided by a change of quarters, privileges, and 
making saluting compulsory. The officers lived separately from the men, only meeting for 
occasional group activities. Here, the youth of the officers played against them, as their better 
treatment despite having little experience produced envy amongst the men. Factors such as these 
separated the officers from their men.7 
Furthermore, the connection between the officer corps and the rank and file soldiers were 
further tested by the terror, often bringing them together. For failures of command, Stalin 
frequently sentenced the entire regiment to the penal battalions, punishment units that were 
frequently given the most dangerous missions and assignments. As such, they had to fight or die 
together, and even bad commands had to be faithfully executed to avoid group punishment. 
Order 227, otherwise known as the “Not a step back!” doctrine, dictated that any man deemed to 
have retreated or deserted without cause was to be “filtered” (sent to penal battalions, to the 
gulag, or shot) by the NKVD (People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs) along with their entire 
family. More specifically, the order was that military councils of the front should eliminate 
retreat battle plans and ensure propaganda that states that retreat is impossible. Furthermore, the 
order was read in all companies, cavalry squadrons, batteries, squadrons, commands and 
                                               
7 W. Victor Madej, Red Army Order of Battle, 1941-1943 (Allentown: Game Publishing Company, 1983), 194-197. 
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headquarters, ensuring that all knew that retreat would mean severe punishment. In November 
1944, Stalin sentenced the entire 214th Cavalry Regiment to the penal unit for not fighting to the 
end to secure their regimental flag in battle. As a result, the 8th and 10th Guard’s Airborne 
Regiments were nearly annihilated, officers and all, trying to defend their flag. One soldier, 
Aleksandr Bodnar, remembered how, upon leaving his tank following it catching fire, it suddenly 
stopped burning making it seem as though he abandoned a working tank, meaning he “lie there, 
thinking about the responsibility for an abandoned tank, what will become of [him].” This 
soldier’s example illustrates the effectiveness of these motivational tactics at ensuring they 
attacked with fervor.8 This terror would also produce some of the greatest mistakes of the 
conflicts, with the inability to make independent, adaptive decisions stemming from both 
commander’s inexperience and the fear of political backlash from such acts. For example, the 
preventable death of Kiriponos, who would not surrender Kiev without an order, and was 
annihilated along with his 400,000 strong unit. Furthermore, the creation of the “Political 
Sections” made sure that all soldiers were aware that their families’ names were on record should 
they retreat or otherwise become traitors, driving them to strong avoidance of appearing to 
dissent. In fact, some would come to describe the Stalinist regulation of informational leadership 
of the SMERSH (SMERt' SHpionam) division, a chekist-style informant agency within the Red 
Army, as “terrorism dressed up in an Army uniform.” SMERSH’s name literally translates to 
“death to spies,” signaling that those who were placed on their blacklist were to be designated 
traitors to the people for acts such as retreating.9 
                                               
8 Roger Reese, Why Stalin’s Soldiers Fought (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2011), 164-167.  
9 Dimitri Panin, The Notebooks of Sologdin (New York: Harcourt, 1973), 108-109. 
Reese, Why Stalin’s Soldiers Fought, 159-160. 
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For those placed into the penal battalions, life was extremely difficult. These 
commanders were “stripped . . . of their decorations, placed . . . at the most dangerous sectors of 
the front and ordered . . . to atone for their guilt with their blood.” A large portion of their ranks 
were initially filled by those who had disobeyed orders, but later became more heavily populated 
with former prisoners of war who had been “liberated.” Oftentimes, these battalions were the last 
to receive needed supplies such as ammunition and food. Furthermore, they were frequently 
assigned some of the most dangerous missions and given very few resources needed to 
accomplish tactical objectives. Yet despite this, many served with relatively high morale and 
valor during the combat, even earning their freedom through recommendations. Alexander 
Pyl’cyn’s memoirs note that during a raid in which they lacked ammunition and other supplies, 
the battalion still managed to take the objective, resulting in commendations which freed the 
shrafniks (or penal soldiers) from their obligations. This codependence and shared suffering, in 
which the brutal conditions required absolute trust from one’s unit while the commander held the 
likely key to liberation, brought the two groups together. Pyl’cyn repeatedly notes examples of 
where the “shrafniks… tried their best to preserve the lives of their commanders.” For an 
example, when Senior Lieutenant Ivan Yanin, a commander who inspired his troops with 
bravery despite the conditions, was wounded, his penal battalion dragged him out of the line of 
fire and found him cover, tending to his wounds. This degree of care for their commanding 
officers was mirrored throughout other non-penal battalions on the front, demonstrating the 
tendency for terror to paradoxically create group intimacy rather than factionalism.  
This connection produced by terror is demonstrated by Grossman’s account of the Battle 
of Stalingrad and the workers’ battalions. For these inexperienced soldiers, the shock of battle 
often proved to be too much, requiring severe NKVD crackdowns with blocker units. The 
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political officers told stories of how these measures steeled their soldiers’ resolve, with one 
instance where a “soldier shot his comrade who had been carrying a wounded man back from the 
battlefield and had raised his hands in surrender” demonstrating that the soldiers themselves had 
a no-retreat mentality (likely because one’s retreat could mean group reprisal). This oppression 
drove a greater mentality of either dying as traitors in a retreat, or dying together on the front, 
giving them a greater sense of forced investment in each other. To soldiers, it was inescapable, 
“once you are here, there is no way out… everyone knew that those who turn and run would be 
shot on the spot. This was more terrifying than Germans.” This sentiment was mirrored by 
Soviet high command. In the meetings with Stalin to discuss the defense of Stalingrad, the 
conversation was as frank as possible. As is reported by General Vasily Chuikov, the interview 
with Yeremenko and Khrushchev regarding his defense of Stalingrad forcefully asked “Comrade 
Chuikov, how do you interpret your task?” Chuikov responded “[w]e will defend the city or die 
in the attempt.” Yeremenko and Khrushchev then told him that he had understood his mission 
perfectly. Furthermore, even in the worst conditions, the soldiers tried enjoying all they could 
before their perceived inevitable end. As Grossman overheard from two other soldiers, a batch of 
reinforcements on the Volga “like an easy life, they hurry to live” their lives before their time in 
Stalingrad. This approach to life and existence portrays the response to the stress of the battle. In 
the hellish landscape of Stalingrad, they took pleasure in each other’s company and made as 
much as they could out of their short remaining lives.  Yet far more poignant than the feelings of 
connection were the “wild anger, an inhuman anger towards Germans” produced by the place 
that soldiers described as “ten times worse than hell” itself. Rather than accepting their 
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conditions and despairing, they worked in a rage against the Germans, boosting morale, 
especially given their own government’s poor supply of their efforts.10 
However, despite the connection produced by situational terror, the role of the 
commander as judge and executioner drove a deadly wedge between them and their soldiers. 
Frontline officers were often ordered to shoot subordinates by superiors. One example is 
Lieutenant Gol’braikh, who, following a failed assault overheard an exchange between the 
division commander and the regiment commander. The division commander asked if he had shot 
any of his officers for the failure, to which he replied no, garnering the response “Then get to 
shooting! This is not a trade union meeting. This is war!” Later that night, the company 
commander was executed in front of the other officers of the battalion. Commanders had the 
duty of killing subordinates for failures, ensuring that there was distrust in the relationship. Once 
Stalin gave the order to shoot those who were retreating or attempting to be captured, there were 
a number of incidents (although quite rare) in which the officers were shot by their own men to 
allow their capture by the Germans.11 This demonstrates the fundamental divide between the 
officers of the war and the soldiers, but also their commonality. Both were repressed by the 
regime, with the threat of execution of themselves and everyone they know hanging over them 
always. Yet the differing responsibilities that could bring about such a fate brought about a 
distinct difference in the solidarity and behavior of both groups. Officers would prefer to be 
nearly annihilated given that they survived as it would save their family and preserve their 
position. However, in the early stages of the war, solders preferred to be captured especially 
given the effectiveness of Nazi propaganda regarding the conditions of their prisoners. This 
                                               
10 Vasily Grossman, A Writer at War (New York: Vintage Books, 2007), 145-148.  
Alexander Pyl’cyn, Penalty Strike: The Memoirs of a Red Army Penal Company Commander, 1943-45 (Solihull: 
Helion and Company, 2006), 97. 
11 Reese, Why Stalin’s Soldiers Fought, 168. 
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would change as the war went on, and knowledge of the brutality with which the Nazis treated 
their prisoners became known, causing them to fight to the death rather than risk capture.12 As 
Merridale puts it, “death was probably a better fate… than capture for Red Army troops,” which 
is confirmed by the account of Lev Mekhlis, a Stavka representative during World War II who 
was responsible for five to seven Soviet fronts. He noted that “they say there’s no shelter, no 
water… people are treated like slaves, shot for the slightest misdemeanor… or for just a kind of 
fun.” Soviet high command realized the value of the horrific treatment of the prisoners for 
motivation. As a nameless Soviet colonel said in 1942, “it’s a horrible thing to say, but by ill-
treating and starving our prisoners to death, the Germans are helping us.”13 Yet this experience 
was not without its concurrent cost in terror. It was “categorically prohibited to become a 
prisoner of war” as the soldiers were then considered “a traitor to the fatherland, with all this 
implied as consequences for his family.” Given the immense losses on the front, these captured 
PoWs were often reintegrated or sent to penal battalions through filtering by the NKVD.14 
In many respects, terror was largely counterproductive both as a deterrent and as a means 
of creating greater fighting efficiency. The most severe punishment, the firing squad, was 
utilized primarily to prevent desertion. Yet the result was not a lesser occurrence. Rather, the 
increasing demoralization, especially in the early stages of the war when things seemed bleakest, 
resulted in massive waves of desertion on the front. Once the death penalty rules became 
standard, the soldiers more frequently would deliberately surrender to the enemy, especially 
following the extreme effectiveness of the Nazi propaganda surrounding the treatment of their 
                                               
12 Roger R Reese, "Surrender and Capture in the Winter War and Great Patriotic War: Which was the Anomaly?," 
Global War Studies 8, no. 1 (2011): 87-98. 
13 Merridale, Ivan’s War, 122-123.  
14 Nick Baron, "Remaking Soviet Society: The Filtration of Returnees from Nazi Germany, 1944–49," In Warlands, 
(London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 89-116. 
Panin, The Notebooks of Sologdin, 109.  
Reese, Why Stalin’s Soldiers Fought, 168-169.   
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prisoners of war. Those who ended up in front of the firing squads were often men dazed and 
shell-shocked with little understanding of the act they had committed. Given the nature of the 
battles this is understandable. Grossman describes soldiers slowly losing their ability to think 
during the battle for Kursk, as “people’s faces were completely black… no one thought of 
sleep… the nerves were strained.” This is not to say that the soldiers at the Battle of Kursk were 
demoralized across the board, as their performance was ferocious, however, this description of 
the conditions of a battle demonstrates how some soldiers may end up dazed and confused.  Due 
to these problems, soldiers tended to view the concept of cowardice very differently than their 
commanders, and punishments could carry a steep price in morale. Many viewed the 
punishments as disproportionate, arbitrary and indiscriminate. Using blocking battalions as a part 
of Order 227 meant that otherwise sound decisions could result in severe punishment and 
filtration. Grossman notes that a brigade commander, facing certain death during the battle for 
Kursk, yelled “we won’t retreat, we’ll stay here to die!” knowing the punishment that would 
befall him should he take one step back. Although the significance of the blocking detachments 
declines as the Soviets went on the offensive, ultimately culminating in their disbandment in 
1944 from an NKO decree, their significance during the first years of the war is definite.15 
In terms of creating productive views of soldiers’ missions during the early years, 
propaganda and party loyalty played a role in both the officer corps and their soldiers. A sizable 
portion of the Red Army were at least receptive to the idea that they must be fighting for a 
greater cause, as the vilification of the enemy was practically a given based on their task. A 
notable development in this propaganda was the creation of Ehrenberg’s May 1942 article on 
                                               
15 Alexander Hill, The Red Army and the Second World War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017), 358.  
Grossman, A Writer at War, 235. 
Reese, Why Stalin’s Soldiers Fought, 230-234.   
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hatred which was a foundational work in the ideological opposition to fascism in the Soviet 
Union. He posited that rather than being an alternative model of socialism, fascism was instead a 
capitalist phenomenon, and counterrevolutionary. In contrast to the Soviet goal of an inevitable 
communist utopia, “Fascism is a monumental attempt to halt the course of history” meaning 
reversing that progress. This expanded the nature of the ideological motivator from simply a 
nationalist goal of protecting the state to protecting the very flow of history itself. This message 
was built on Stalin’s idea that the German’s were “reactionary feudal barons.” This seemed 
intuitive to Stalin as “only liars can assert that the German fascists, who have introduced slave 
labor... and resurrected serfdom… are champions of the workers and peasants.”  However, 
despite the strong message, the rapid shift in 1940 between the idea of the Nazis as a peaceful 
friend that the Soviet state must coexist with to them being a group of warmongering marauders 
caught many by surprise. As such, the propaganda machine had the arduous task of creating a 
dehumanizing mold for the German forces. They began by calling the enemy “Fritz” or “Hans,” 
and the Soviet forces, not realizing they were German personal names, used the names for the 
“Italian Fritz” or the “Romanian Fritz.” However, GlavPUR (Central Political Office of the 
Soviet Armed Forces), functioning as the war propaganda ministry, failed to convince many that 
the poor performance they had witnessed on the battlefield was actually better than they thought. 
As a result, many rejected wholesale all news from the ministry, regardless of merit. 
Furthermore, GlavPUR did not find the allies it hoped for in the commanders, despite their 
political backgrounds, as many times they were as demoralized as the soldiers with regards to the 
progress of the Red Army. The main informative report from the 43rd Army group on the effect 
of propaganda notes that while few found it convincing, making them prone to rumors and Nazi 
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propaganda, they frequently consumed it and wrote about it in letters home. Thus, the exact 
effect of propaganda on the nature of overall Soviet morale is difficult to ascertain.16  
However, the main failure was in convincing the Red Army that complete victory could 
be had, as doubts about the complete capitulation of Germany would persist until as late as 
January 1945. Where the propaganda appears to be more successful was in the ideological 
campaign for Communism and the appeal to nationalism through Russian poetry and song. By 
tapping into the personal heritage of the soldier, at least the ethnic Russian soldiers, the 
GlavPUR succeeded in making the Nazi assault appear to be an assault on Russian heritage 
itself. Vasily Grossman, in his work as a war correspondent, witnessed the power of nationalism 
amongst the ethnic Russian troops, remarking that “at war, a Russian man puts on a white shirt. 
He may live in sin, but he dies like a saint… we Russians don’t know how to live like saints, we 
only know how to die like saints. The front [represents] the holiness of Russian death.” The spirit 
of sacrifice in the name of the Russian people amongst the soldiers was immense and extremely 
visible to Grossman in his work on the front lines.17 In reality, truth of the matter is that the 
propaganda was hardly necessary once the Nazi forces had reached far enough into Soviet 
territory. The Soviet soldiers were painfully aware of their singular position as the only force left 
fighting the Nazis on the ground as well as their chronic supply and command problems. This 
was only reinforced with the spreading of atrocities committed by the Nazi invaders in 1942-
1943. Viewing the Nazi war crimes firsthand, they knew that their fight, regardless of their 
position on the leadership of the Soviet Union, was one for the survival of the nation. Grossman 
recounts the horror told to Soviet soldiers by the remaining residents at the “killing grounds of 
Berdichev.” A kosher butcher was forced to slaughter and dismember his neighbor’s children at 
                                               
16 Reese, Why Stalin’s Soldiers Fought, 190-195. 
17 Grossman, A Writer at War, 95.  
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gunpoint as a “joke” by a German commander who “wanted to see his work.” When Jews were 
forced to jump into a toxic vat at a tannery “Germans thought the execution funny: they were 
tanning Jewish skin.” Women were forcibly drowned in “swimming contests” where the 
Germans would give false hope of survival if they made it across the river and then shot those 
that did. In the face of such horrors, the Soviets came to the obvious conclusion that it was to 
fight or endure a fate worse than death.18 
In terms of positive incentives, one commonality between the commanders and the 
soldiers is that they both received medals and commendations for their actions should they 
succeed. Medals were still relatively new as the revolutionaries of the Soviet Union tended to 
largely view them as a sign of the bourgeois elite prior to the Great Patriotic War (although some 
medals did exist and were awarded, the practice was nowhere near as widespread). As a 
motivational tactic, it seems that their effectiveness was mixed. While there is strong evidence of 
the desire to work for medals given the privileges and status it would afford their families at 
home, the system was quite arbitrary, causing distrust of being rewarded for harder work. The 
medals were “given out based on distribution lists, and not for actions.” The accounts of a soldier 
named Natalia Peshkova are especially illustrative of the Soviet approach to medals. Few 
received medals for their actions, and many simply took them from dead comrades. Yet the act 
of taking them from their comrades demonstrates that they did have some value to these soldiers, 
for one does not carry unnecessary items in a war zone. For the commanders too, this could end 
up driving another wedge between them and their soldiers. When Peshkova’s Lieutenant was 
asked why he had not recommended anyone for a medal following a victory, he replied “I wasn’t 
                                               
18 Grossman, A Writer at War, 256-258. 
Merridale, Ivan’s War, 3. 
Reese, Why Stalin’s Soldiers Fought, 192-195.   
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recommended and I’m not recommending anyone.” This bitterness displayed by their 
commander created a feeling of general hatred as it deprived the soldiers of their medals due to 
their commander’s selfishness. Given these caveats to the forms of positive motivation, it is 
difficult to discern the net effect of these awards in terms of group morale.19 
One theme that continues to appear is the effect of poor leadership on the group morale 
and the ability of commanders to inspire their soldiers. Given the ineptitude of the commanders, 
especially in the early stages of the war, soldiers rapidly lost respect for officers, causing mass 
disobedience. The most prominent issue was that many of the commanders lacked the knowledge 
of how to inspire the troops during combat. During the siege of Kiev, one commander, 
Lieutenant Cherkasov, ordered the troops to hastily counterattack against an entrenched German 
position by getting out of cover and yelling “for the Rodina, for Stalin!” Only five of his ninety 
men followed. Rather than going over to curse them out, as was the norm, Cherkasov went back 
to his men and explained the plan and their steps. They retook the position and despite losses, the 
men were well motivated. This strategy was the exception rather than the rule and demonstrates 
how ineffective many of the commanders were in leading forces. Part of the reason these failures 
spread was that infractions could oftentimes not be reported as they would reflect badly on the 
commander, allowing the men to go free for failures of courage. By forcing their men to charge 
on suspected suicide missions, they lost the ability to effectively demand their soldiers to follow 
them readily. While these missions decreased as the war progressed, it characterized a significant 
portion of the conflict.20 
                                               
19 Amir Weiner, Making Sense of War: The Second World War and the Fate of the Bolshevik Revolution (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2001), 347. 
Reese, Why Stalin’s Soldiers Fought, 208-209. 
20 Reese, Why Stalin’s Soldiers Fought, 203.   
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To understand the changes that would truly revolutionize the structure and morale of the 
Red Army, one must look to the Battle of Stalingrad. During a fight to the death, one has no time 
for complex political maneuvering. As a result, the commanders promoted from within tended to 
be those whose merit was well known. Furthermore, in the course of the battle traditional 
methods of command were impossible given the fragmented nature of combat in a destroyed 
urban environment. As a result, the small groups (called “Storm Groups” by the Red Army) with 
independent command decisions over combat took precedent over the otherwise heavily 
bureaucratic nature of the Soviet command structure.21 Units were often left to fend for 
themselves, creating greater unity between the smaller units through more intimate ties. Soldiers 
on the front lines like Mansur Abdulin openly fought with the idea of “why am I safe and sound 
in this hell, when most of my comrades are dead and wounded.” Through logics of commonality 
and group bonding, soldiers fought harder with higher morale in these smaller and more intimate 
groups than they did in other larger and more impersonal groupings. Furthering their distance 
from the command structure, soldiers found themselves utterly unlike the nature of the well-
prepared, disciplined soldiers their commanders aspired for them to be. Abdulin was “covered in 
soot” but thought that even though “[their] commanders wanted them to be clean... they could 
not make us” because their small groups had control over enforcement. The soldiers laughed at 
these demands, demonstrating a form of intergroup cohesion that was independent of the 
commanders and openly critical of the top-down structure that categorized much of the early 
stages of the war.22 
This motivation from intimate connection is referred to as Primary Group Theory, which 
means that going through hardship with the same people tends to form group bonds that can 
                                               
21 V.E. Tarrant, Stalingrad (South Yorkshire: Pen and Sword, 1992), 77. 
22 Mansur Abdulin, Red Road from Stalingrad (South Yorkshire: Pen & Sword Books, 2004), 38. 
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compel action. Many battalions described themselves as family and bonded based on shared 
circumstance. Semion Chumanev, a frontovik or front-line soldier, described his platoon as “like 
one family. We not only fought together, but also loved to sing and had some ‘problems of the 
heart.”23 This group mentality created greater group adaptability and willingness to fight for their 
comrades. Furthermore, unlike other motivators, group cohesion was a bonding force between 
the commanders and their soldiers. The reasoning behind this was simple, as the case of Viktor 
Leonov demonstrates. When his commander fell in battle, he demanded to be shot to lighten 
their load, but the soldiers refused. This was to prevent the logical subsequent thought among the 
rank and file soldiers that “if we’ve abandoned a commanding officer, I would be abandoned for 
sure.”24 Due to these assumptions, the group ideal was extended to the commanders despite their 
role as the extender of discipline. This phenomenon is what Grossman calls the “Stalingrad 
Academy,” creating a system of group cohesion through trial by fire. As subsequent 
engagements occur, soldiers begin to trust both their commanders and each other.25 
Furthermore, the nature of the war itself changed the morale and willingness to fight until 
the very end. As Abdulin put it, “there is no pleasure in killing…but why did the Germans 
invade our home? Did they expect us to give up without a fight?” For the soldiers, to take a step 
back was to allow the Germans to seize their home territory, something which would demand 
them to surrender the very core of their spirit. As such, even in these conditions, morale was 
higher than one might expect from a group of starving, outgunned soldiers. Unlike in the Winter 
War, they were not fighting for an objective simply because high command had designated it as 
important, but rather because their own families and people were at risk. The Luftwaffe bombs 
                                               
23 Reese, Why Stalin’s Soldiers Fought, 219.  
24 Reese, Why Stalin’s Soldiers Fought, 220. 
25 Grossman, A Writer at War, 154-156. 
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had burned alive thousands of women and children right in front of their eyes in the first two 
days of the battle. It did not take much convincing to believe that they were fighting the 
embodiment of savagery in warfare, despite their own qualms. This was reflected in the posters 
around the city for the militias, which begged the people of the town to “take vengeance on the 
Germans… for every atrocity committed, for the bloodshed and the tears of our children, our 
mothers, our wives.” The people of the city came together, building a system of barricades 
overnight that would prove critical to the outcome of the battle. The fighting strength of basically 
untrained militia units was also admirable. Although they inflicted few casualties, they held their 
positions for a long enough time that the main corps of the Red Army was able to set forth 
defensive positions, quelling the bloodletting of the blitzkrieg a period of time.26 
The regime did not entirely rely on coercion but was not so naïve as to believe that they 
could get by on rote patriotism alone. They proclaimed the need for commander-based leadership 
but made little effort to ensure that the commanders received adequate discipline to achieve this. 
Military honors and pride helped, alongside the cohesion of the primary group, however 
fractured and fluctuating. The morale and overall motivations of both the soldiers and their 
commanders is not uniform, but in most cases their effectiveness in the worst possible conditions 
is admirable, especially under the continual threat provided by political sections, informants, and 
the Chekist threat from SMERSH and their military tribunals. As Captain Sergei Kournakoff 
notes, writing during the Great Patriotic War, the Soviet high command had divided soldiers’ 
justifications for morale into three categories: fatalistic morale, team morale based on comradery, 
and ideological morale. Fatalistic morale is characterized by its tendency to relate to that in the 
mind of soldiers, they have no choice given the punishments, and as such had no choice to say 
                                               
26 Tarrant, Stalingrad, 56-57.  
Abdulin, Red Road to Stalingrad, 55. 
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simply “Kismet!” (what happens is fate) signifying that they were faced with no option but to 
rely on faith.  Especially during the Great Patriotic War, what the soldier defends is “near and 
substantial” and thus even if death is largely inevitable, it becomes a moral choice to fight till 
their last breath. On the other hand, the more favored alternative was the esprit de corps based on 
a group bond forged through trials, wherein the defense of one’s regiment drives a stronger 
desire to fight. And finally, the ideological morale was the ideal situation although, as 
Kournakoff notes, this is difficult to achieve given that the men must already believe in the 
justness of the cause to believe their ideology is functioning correctly. This analysis of the 
morale factors of the Red Army was backed by both German and American analyses of the 
situation.27 However, Kournakoff’s notes along with high command’s interpretation of morale is 
deeply flawed. Rather than relying on any of these three forms of morale alone, many found 
interrelated and intrinsic sets of motivation. For example, Kournakoff myopically states that 
there is no division between the commanders and their soldiers as they are all of one class. The 
historical evidence demonstrates what form of naïve idealism this statement portrays. Distrust 
between the soldiers and their commanding officers was rampant to the point of being nearly 
institutionalized. Frequently, soldiers would combine all of these forms of morale. One could 
recognize the futility of fighting back while still being motivated by the need to protect their 
family and comrades.28 
By the end of the Great Patriotic War, the timeline of the creation of the terror within and 
external to the Red Army reveals the true nature of the continual effect of terror on inter-soldier 
and commander cohesion. Through the systematic de-professionalization of the Red Army and 
the forced political subservience, the Red Army inevitably became a target should it challenge 
                                               
27 Madej, Red Army Order of Battle, 1941-1943, 193-197.  
28 Sergei Kournakoff, Russia’s Fighting Forces (New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1942), 94-97. 
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Stalin in the political arena. Given the continuous nature of the terror, as chistki began with the 
first years of Stalin’s ascent to power, Stalin’s campaign against the Red Army drastically 
changed its culture of adaptability and meritocratic norms while reducing its efficiency as a 
fighting force. By institutionalizing the undertraining and overpromotion of commanders, the 
overall ability of commanders declined precipitously, despite some exceptions, causing splits 
between commanders and their soldiers. Furthermore, given that the campaign of terror 
continued into the first years of the Great Patriotic War, the effects could not be remediated in 
time for the efficiency deficits to be corrected. Thus, the divisions produced among the officers 
would have detrimental effects in all major military encounters during this period of Stalin’s 
reign. Despite the common bond produced by units under fire, commanders were often isolated 
from the intimacy experienced between soldiers which drove them through much of the war. As 
a result, the primary drivers of morale became group cohesion between soldiers, propaganda and 
ideology. In discussing the effect of the terror on morale, some results demonstrate that while the 
effect of terror was the destruction of certain types of intimacy, overall causality runs in the 
opposite direction, as when the terror and restrictions decreased, group cohesion increased. This 
outcome indicates that the intimacy created as a part of terror was more of a strategy to survive 
and make the most of the world of terror, rather than a driver of morale and intimacy itself. Thus, 
the Soviet high command’s decision to decrease the campaign of political control, punishments, 
and filtration elicited stronger group cohesion than terror by allowing for a freedom of action that 
facilitated stronger interpersonal bonds. 
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